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The Challenge of Latent Physical
Effects of Toxic Substances: The Next
Step in the Evolution of Toxic Torts
INTRODUCTION
The scenario is an ever-increasing reality of our techno-
chemical era: an individual is exposed to toxic or hazardous
substances' and seeks to right this wrong by bringing a toxic
tort suit against an alleged wrongdoer.
2
The victim of toxic poisoning may suffer acute injury,3 that
is, injury that is manifest, such as dizziness, headaches, general
I Governmentally regulated substances are usually classified, not always
with precise distinction, as "hazardous" or "toxic." Generally, hazardous
substances are toxic, corrosive, ignitable, or chemically reactive materials
posing a threat to humans; in the last several decades, the term sometimes
has been expanded in federal law to include threats to the ecosystem. Toxic
substances, a smaller category, includes only those materials that produce
"detrimental effects on living organisms."
Walter A. Rosenbaum, ENVIRONMENTAL POUTICS AND POLICY 214 (2d ed. 1991)(footnote
omitted).
2 "The term 'toxic tort' generally refers to illness, injury, or property damage
which is caused by exposure to hazardous or toxic substances and which may be
compensable under traditional common law tort theories." Jennifer L. Machlin &
Tomme R. Young, MANAGING ENVIRONMENTAL RISK: REAL ESTATE AND BUSINESS TRANS-
ACTIONS §7.01 (1990).
As just one indication of the amount of toxic and hazardous substances in our
environment, the total national clean-up bill for hazardous waste sites in the United
States was estimated in 1989 by the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) to be about
$500 billion. Congress of the United States, Office of Technology Assessment, Coming
Clean: Superfund Problems Can Be Solved 27 (1989).
1 "The traditional personal injury case involves a traumatic or acute injury, readily
apparent to the affected individual and to others which has a clear causal origin in some
identifiable condition, agent or act." Allan Kanner, Emerging Conceptions of Latent
Personal Injuries in Toxic Tort Litigation, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 343, 353 (1987).
"Acute effects usually occur within a relatively short time (up to 24 hours) ... 
Chris F. Wilkinson, Toxicology and the Law, in THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN Toxic TORT
LITIGATION: EvALuATINo CAUSATION AND RISK 109, 114 (1989).
An acute injury "generally accrues from a single, high dose exposure or event."
Ilene R. Danse, Health Risks of 'Contaminated' Property: A Primer of Toxicology, in
ENVIRONMENTAL LIAB.ITY AND REAL PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE 25,
40 (Joel S. Moskowitz ed. 1989).
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malaise, nausea, or other ascertainable bodily harms.4 However,
because of the latent effects of toxic chemicals on the human
body,5 the victim may not exhibit signs of toxic exposure for
years or even decades. 6 Even if no manifestation occurs, the
victim of toxic exposure may be at an increased risk of devel-
oping cancer or other diseases because of subcellular or genetic
injury caused by the exposure.7
The latent and subtle effects of toxic substances in humans
have presented the courts with the challenge of squaring recovery
for these unique injuries with traditional tort doctrine.8 Courts
have met this challenge in a variety of ways. One method is to
Such acute injuries were claimed by homeowners exposed to termiticide in Villari
v. Terminix Intern., Inc., 663 F. Supp 727, 728 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
' "Latency" refers to the long dormancy period of the effects of toxic substance
exposure. Fournier J. Gale, III & James L. Goyer, Recovery for Cancerphobia and
Increased Risk of Cancer, 15 CuMa. L. REV. 723 (1984-5).
See generally Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV.
1458, 1618 (1986); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases:
A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 49, 852 (1984).
6 Carcinogens have a latency period of between five and forty years. Michael C.
Donovan, Evolving Issues in Toxic Tort Law: What Happens When Clean-Up is Not
Enough, in ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS IN NATURAL RESOURCE AND REAL PROPERTY
TRANSACTIONS, Paper No. 9, Page No. 4 (Rocky Mt. Min. L. Fdn. 1988).
A latency period can span two or more decades. Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 852.
Latency periods can range between fifteen and thirty years. Developments in the Law:
Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 5, at 1603 n.8.
' Plaintiffs passed the summary judgment hurdle and were able to present claims
of cellular and subccllular damage to the jury in Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp., 586
F. Supp. 14, 17-18 (D. Colo. 1984).
Plaintiffs successfully presented a claim that "minute biochemical lesions" in the
double-helix of the DNA in the nuclei of their cells might lead to adverse health effects.
Askey v. Occidental Chemical Corp., 477 N.Y.S.2d 242, 245 (1984). But see Sterling v.
Velsicol Chemical Corporation, 855 F.2d 1188, 1207-1209 (6th Cir. 1988) (claim of
immune system damage failed due to insufficient requisite medical tests and widely
accepted medical bases to support experts' opinions); Arvin Maskin, Overview and
Update of Emerging Damage Theories in Toxic Tort Litigation, Tit ROLE OF SCIENCE
IN Toxic TORT LITIGATION: EVALUATING CAUSATION AND RISK 99-107 (1989) (critical
analysis of the claim for immunotoxicity, or rather, "chemically induced immune dis-
regulation" (CIID) in toxic tort cases).
I The court in Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 298-299 (N.J. 1987)
wrote:
[W]e must recognize that the issues presented by this case and others like
it will be recurring. We note the difficulty that both law and science
experience in attempting to deal with the emerging complexities of indus-
trialized society and the consequent implications for human health.
There remains the moral and legal problem of compensating the human
victims of past misuse of chemical products .... Without a comprehensive
governmental response to the problem of compensating victims of toxic
exposure, the only available remedy lies within the legal system.
[VOL. 7:227
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allow experts to testify9 and use epidemiological data as evi-
dence.10Another innovation has been to recognize causes of ac-
tion for the increased risk of developing cancer or other diseases,"
and for the fear of developing cancer, also known as "cancer-
phobia."'" Yet another avenue is to allow plaintiffs to recover
as an element of damages the cost of future medical monitoring
or surveillance of their health. 3 Rather than resort to the estab-
lishment of "science courts" with judges and experts proficient
in law and science or medicine deciding such cases,' 4 the present
judicial system has proven it is capable of handling toxic tort
suits by shaping traditional common law tort theory to encom-
pass toxic torts. 5
Initial medical and environmental tests to determine whether
injury has resulted from toxic exposure may be so costly that
potential plaintiffs may be unable to establish causes of actions
simply because they cannot afford to prove an injury in fact.'
6
9 See generally Gates v. United States, 707 F.2d 1141 (10th Cir. 1983); In re Paoli
R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 916 F.2d 829 (3rd. Cir. 1990); Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical
Corporation, 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988).
o See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
See generally Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987); Brafford
v. Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14 (D. Colo. 1984); Jackson v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1986).
,2 See generally Hagerty v. L & L Marine Services, Inc., 788 F.2d 315 (5th Cir.
1986); Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988).
11 See generally Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987); Askey
v. Occidental Chemical Corporation, 477 N.Y.S.2d 242 (1984); Burns v. Jacquays Mining
Corp., 752 P.2d 28 (Ariz. App. 1988).
14 To facilitate the judges' ability to adequately review decisions made by
technical experts in administrative agencies, Judge Leventhal argued that
judges should have access to court-appointed scientific experts to assist
them in understanding the conflicting testimony of adversarial expert wit-
nesses. Others have argued that the United States needs, on these knotty
technical issues, a specialized federal court with "unbiased" judges trained
not only in legal procedures, but also in technical areas. A third suggestion
for increasing technical expertise in the process is for creating a "science
court" composed of natural scientists to define the common ground among
experts over controversies involving scientific phenomena. These panels of
expert judges would not be asked to make value judgments, but would
rule only on the scientific aspects of the policy.
Wenner, Environmental Policy in the Courts, ENVIRONMENTAL POuCY IN THE 1990s:
TOWARD A NEW AGENDA 195 (N.J. Vig ed. 1990).
11 See supra notes 9-15 and accompanying text.
16 The cost of proving medical causation remains a substantial barrier to
many plaintiffs. Because the issue is complex, litigating medical causation
may add days to an already lengthy trial. Also, the plaintiff will have to
pay for extensive discovery, epidemiological and toxicological studies, and
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Given the evolution of legal theory regarding toxic tort cases,
this note proposes that plaintiffs who can establish prima facie
evidence 7 of toxic exposure by a particular defendant, but who
do not have the financial resources to pay for tests to determine
injuries in fact, can have tests performed at defendant's expense
so long as the defendant is in a better position to bear the costs
of these tests.
Holding defendants initially liable for such preliminary mon-
itoring costs in limited situations 8 is, in addition to being just, 9
the next step in the evolution of toxic torts law. If a prima facie
case can be made against defendants for responsibility for the
toxic exposure in question, and if defendants are in a better
position to bear the costs of initial testing of plaintiffs for the
effects of toxic exposure, defendants should be held to those
expert witness testimony. These fiscal realities have led several commen-
tators to conclude that the costs associated with proving medical causation
will bar many toxic waste actions in which the anticipated damage award
is not extremely high.
Developments in the Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 5 at 1623 (footnotes
omitted).
Concerning a case involving the release of hydrogen sulfide gas from an
oil well (Warner v. Jennings Petroleum Corp., No. 86-3410-CE, Otsego
County, Mich. Cir. Ct., Feb. 10, 1989, mediation order), one legal com-
mentator wrote:
Plaintiffs and their attorneys tried to locate physicians, toxicologists or
ecology internists to assess their case, run tests and testify on their behalf.
They were told that it would cost them at least $1000 per day and at least
$20,000 in order for these experts to assist them. Plaintiffs' income was
less than $10,000 per year, and the state of the law is such that no law
firm would "bankroll" the case.
James M. Olson, Shfting the Burden of Proof: How the Common Law Can Safeguard
Nature and Promote an Earth Ethic, 20 ENVTL. L. 891, 902 (1990).
11 "Prima facie evidence" is "[e]vidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted,
is sufficient to sustain a judgment in favor of the issue which it supports, but which
may be contradicted by other evidence." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1190 (6th ed. 1990).
See infra text accompanying notes 126-27.
"It is inequitable for an individual wrongfully exposed to dangerous toxic
chemicals but unable to prove that disease is likely, to have to pay his own expenses
when medical intervention is clearly reasonable and necessary." Ayers v. Township of
Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 312 (N.J. 1987).
The seemingly flippant disregard of a recognizable, albeit latent, injury
is becoming a less tenable judicial attitude for a number of reasons. First,
the equation of risk and noninjury is becoming less tenable as a matter of
fact.
Second, both equity and prudence requires that something be done about
such latent injuries.
Kanner, supra note 3, at 350 (footnote omitted).
Toxic TORTS
costs, provided a system is set up to ensure reimbursement of
the costs if defendants ultimately prevail on the merits of the
case. 2 0
The concept of forcing a defendant to pay the costs of
determining, in essence, whether or not a plaintiff has a cause
of action against that defendant may offend basic notions of
fairness in tort law at first glance. It is a fundamental tenet of
legal theory that one party is not obliged to make out his or her
opponent's case.2
However, payment by a defendant of such initial medical
testing of plaintiffs was ordered by the District of Columbia
Circuit Court in Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed
Aircraft Corporation in 1984.2 The Friends for All Children
court went to great lengths to set up a system of payment of
such medical testing that would be fair to defendant Lockheed.
2 3
Also, the Friends for All Children court discussed the limited
circumstances under which such a system would be appropriate.2
To understand how forcing a defendant to pay for the initial
medical tests of plaintiffs in toxic tort cases is the logical exten-
sion of current toxic tort law, the evolution of the courts'
handling of the latent effects of toxic substances must be ex-
amined.
Part I of this note discusses the courts' gradual acceptance
of epidemiological studies and expert testimony as valid, admis-
sible evidence in toxic tort cases. Increased risk of cancer or
disease as a cause of action in toxic tort cases is explored in
Part II, and recovery for fear of the potential development of
cancer or "cancerphobia," 2 in Part III. Medical monitoring or
surveillance as a recoverable damage in toxic tort cases is dis-
" See infra notes 115-117 and accompanying text.
21 "The burden of proof of the defendant's negligence is quite uniformly upon the
plaintiff, since he is asking the court for relief, and must lose if his case does not
outweigh that of the defendant's." W. Page Keeton, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 38, at 239 (5th ed. 1984) (footnote omitted).
' Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, 746 F.2d 816,
826 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
21 See infra notes 115-117, 125 and accompanying text.
, See infra notes 113-114, 122 and accompanying text.
"Cancerphobia" is mental anguish from the fear of contracting cancer. Gale &
Goyer, supra note 6, at 724. "A claim for 'fear of disease,' sometimes referred to as
'cancerphobia,' refers to a claim for present injury (i.e., emotional distress or apprehen-
sion) due to the possibility of a future injury (i.e., cancer), caused by a defendant's
negligence." Maskin, supra note 7, at 75.
1991-921
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cussed in Part IV. Finally, Part V analyzes the Friends for All
Children, Inc. decision, and the Conclusion discusses its poten-
tial application to toxic tort suits.
1. THE USE OF EPIDEMIOLOGICAL DATA AND EXPERTS IN Toxic
TORT CASES
Epidemiology is the study of the distribution and determi-
nants of diseases in human populations. Epidemiologic studies
of particular interest in relation to toxic substances litigation are
those studies of human populations that associate disease with
measured exposures of toxic agents.26 Because of the long latency
periods of the effects of toxic exposure and the complexities of
toxically-caused diseases,2 ' epidemiological evidence is often the
best, or only, evidence a plaintiff has to establish proof of harm
in a toxic tort case.
The statistical measure of a toxic substance's relation to a
particular disease, the substance's "attributable risk," is "the
best proof of causation [in a toxic tort case] and is of 'critical
importance' to a plaintiff's recovery . . . . "2 Thus, such scien-
tific evidence establishes the causal nexus between the toxic
substance exposure and injury-in-fact of the plaintiff, a nexus
that would otherwise be impossible to establish.
29
Courts have gradually accepted the use of epidemiological
data in toxic tort cases, 0 but such acceptance has not come
without criticism and warning from legal commentators.
In addition to concern over simplistic summaries of complex
scientific data to juries,"' the difficulty of cross-examination of
Phillip E. Enterline, The Role of Epidemiology and Biostatistics in Toxic Subst-
ances Litigation, in THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN Toxic TORT Lmo.ArON: EVALUATING
CAUSATION AND RISK 125, 126 (1989).
"Most epidemiologic studies have sought to relate three aspects of exposure to
increased risk of disease: 1) the concentration of a substance in the individual's environ-
ment, 2) the length of time this concentration persisted and 3) the time between exposure
and when the disease was first observed." Id. at 127.
Rosenberg, supra note 5, at 858.
Developments in the Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 5 at 1618.
Id.
Jeffrey Trauberman, Statutory Reform of 'Toxic Torts': Relieving Legal, Sci-
entific, and Economic Burdens on the Chemical Victim, 7 HA~v. ENVy. L. REV. 177,
198 (1983); Developments in the Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 5, at 1618.
" Michael Dore, A Commentary on the Use of Epidemiological Evidence in
Demonstrating Cause-in-Fact, 7 HAxv. EsvTn. L. REv. 429, 438 (1983). Cf Danse,
[VOL. 7:227
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experts presenting epidemiological data,32 and the potential for
juries to give such statistical data "too much weight," 33 one
author asserts:
The only individual cause-and-effect relationship that epide-
miological evidence can show is that the defendant's conduct
increased the plaintiff's risk of injury to some statistically
measurable extent. It cannot answer the critical question whether
the defendant's conduct actually injured the plaintiff.
Personal injury cases become judicial lotteries when the trier
of fact speculates on the connection between demonstrated risk
and alleged causation.-
The above-quoted author ultimately recommends that courts
should exercise "stringent and consistent controls over the use
of epidemiological evidence" in personal injury toxic tort cases,
evidence which he views as a "wild card [i]n a litigation system
that already departs from the ideal of rationality.'""
However, other commentators stress that because "the
etiology3' of most chemically induced disease will never afford
us such precision '" 7 as traditionally has been expected when
establishing cause-in-fact in tort cases, epidemiological studies
offer the only means of providing at least circumstantial evidence
in toxic tort cases." Given the limitations of establishing causal
connection in toxic tort cases "in a modern world, restricting
plaintiffs to the traditional standards of proof of causation will
lead to serious problems of unfairness and inefficiency in the
area of toxic torts.
' 39
supra note 3. at 31:
The public policy debate over chemical waste is therefore not, for the most
part, based upon knowledge of human health effects, and such knowledge
that is available is usually overlooked or ignored. Some policymakers realize
this yet argue that, in the absence of "proof" that a substance is safe in
a given environment even at trace levels, limitless litigation and expense
are justified to eliminate "potential" exposure to a chemical.
32 Dore, supra note 31, at 438.
Id. at 437.
Id. at 436 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
Id. at 440.
"Etiology" is "a branch of medical science concerned with the causes and
origins of diseases." WESER's Nn'rr New COLLEOATE DIcIONARY 427 (1988).
1" Kristine L. Hall & Ellen K. Silbergeld, Reappraising Epidemiology: A Response
to Mr. Dore, 7 HAtv. ENvTL. L. Ray. 441, 442 (1983).
Id. at 445.
Id. at 444. Cf. Developments in the Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note
1991-921
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Courts appear to be adopting both the view that epidemio-
logical data is integral to toxic tort cases and the idea that such
data needs to be handled carefully to ensure an appropriate
treatment of such data by the fact-finder.
A toxic tort case illustrative of a court's handling of epide-
miological data and experts is In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB
Litigation, decided in 1990 by the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. 40 A total of thirty-eight people who worked in or lived
near the Paoli railyard in Pennsylvania claimed injury from
exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls,4 1 commonly known as
PCBs. 42 The trial court in a series of pre-trial evidentiary rulings
excluded the plaintiffs' expert reports and testimony, the epide-
miological evidence necessary for plaintiffs to establish their
causes of action. 43 Plaintiffs' experts included an environmental
chemist, a toxicologist, an immunology/human diseases special-
ist, a clinical pharmacologist, an industrial hygienist, and med-
ical doctors. 44 As a result of the trial court's exclusion of the
varying experts' testimonies and reports, including an epidemi-
ological "meta-analysis" conducted by a physicist,45 the Paoli
defendants were granted summary judgment because the plain-
tiffs had no other evidence to offer."
5, at 1620: "The common law's resistance to the use of accurate statistical studies reflects
a policy choice that insulates industries from liability for harms that they have almost
certainly caused but that do not lend themselves to traditional forms of particularistic
proof."
- In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 916 F.2d 829 (3rd. Cir. 1990).
" [T]he Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601, 2671 (1982
& Supp. 1991)], specifically regulates the production, use, and disposal of
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), the only chemicals singled out by name
for special attention in the Act. PCBs have long been used for their
chemical stability, fire resistance, and electrical resistance properties. They
are frequently used in electrical transformers and capacitors. The EPA
estimates that up to 400 million pounds of PCBs have entered the envi-
ronment. Approximately twenty-five to thirty percent of this amount is a
direct source of contamination for wildlife and humans, and PCBs are
extremely toxic to humans and wildlife.
Frederick R. Anderson, Daniel R. Mandelker, and A. Dan Tarlock, ENVIKOM4ENTAL
PROTECTiON: LAW AND PoLIcY 586 (2d ed. 1990).
Paoli, 916 F.2d at 835.
4'Id.
Id. at 838-841.
4 Id. at 841. "Meta-analysis involves combining the results of different epidemi-
ological studies done by other scientists, and re-analyzing the combined data to see if
the data, in toto, renders different results than the individual studies done with a smaller




Recognizing that the plaintiffs' toxic tort cases depended
upon expert testimony concerning exposure to PCBs and the
harm such exposure can cause,47 the Third Circuit set aside the
trial court's exclusion of most of the plaintiffs' expert opinion
evidence under Rule 7034 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.49
The major flaw with the Paoli trial court's exclusion of evidence,
according to the Third Circuit, was the lack of proof that the
trial court made a "factual inquiry" into the general acceptance
of the factual bases for the experts' opinions.5 0 The appellate
court wrote: "Moreover, it is not clear that the court was not
merely choosing between opinions as opposed to excluding plain-
tiff's opinion on evidentiary grounds."'"
The Third Circuit also determined in Paoli that the trial
court abused its discretion when it used Rule 70252 either ex-
plicitly or implicitly, to exclude the testimony of experts whom
the trial court found to be unqualified, 3 and the "meta-analy-
sis" of a physicist which the trial court found to be an inad-
missible novel scientific technique.5 4 Concerning the "meta-
analysis," the court wrote:
Dr. Nicholson's meta-analysis is particularly important in this
case because it is one of the few pieces of direct evidence
indicating that PCBs actually cause disease. If there is no
evidence of causation in the record, then the plaintiffs cannot
survive a motion for summary judgment."
,1 Paoli, 916 F.2d at 838.
, Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states:
Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts: The facts or data in the particular
case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those
perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of
a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be
admissible in evidence. (Emphasis added.).
49 Paoli, 916 F.2d at 854.
" Id. at 853.
51 Id.
11 Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states:
Testimony by Experts: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowl-
edge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise. (Emphasis added.).
Paoli, 916 F.2d at 855-56.
Id. at 856-59.
" Id. at 856.
1991-92]
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The Paoli case serves as a good example of how the courts
have come to recognize the need for epidemiological data and
experts in toxic tort cases, as well as the need to continue to
apply traditional evidentiary tests to such scientific evidence.
II. INCREASED RISK OF DEVELOPING CANCER OR OTHER
DISEASE
Compared with a few years ago,56 there is now wider judicial
acceptance of recovery for increased or enhanced risk of cancer
or other disease resulting from toxic exposure, another indication
of the judicial system's willingness to mold traditional tort law
to accommodate the latent qualities of toxic substance expo-
sure.
57
Recovery for increased risk of future injury has its roots in
non-toxic tort cases. In Martin v. City of New Orleans, a man
shot in the neck was able to recover for risk of future compli-
cations from a bullet lodged near his spinal cord. 58 Because
medical doctors testified it was too dangerous to remove the
bullet, the court held that the plaintiff was permanently at risk
of future harm that could be life-threatening, and thus could
recover for such risk.59 Similarly, a woman who suffered a
permanent defect in the base of her skull as a result of an
automobile accident was able to recover for the risk of such
future complications as infection and meningitis in Davis v.
Graviss.60
The judicial consensus appears to be that, in order to recover
for increased risk of developing cancer or other disease in toxic
tort cases, the plaintiff must show an existing injury from which
future harm could flow. Hand-in-hand with this "existing in-
Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. I11. 1978), a case in
which pregnant women were given diethylstilbestrol (DES) during prenatal care without
their knowledge or consent, illustrates past judicial attitude about increased risk of
cancer claims: "The closest the complaint comes to alleging physical injury is the
allegation of a 'risk' of cancer. The mere fact of risk without any accompanying physical
injury is insufficient to state a claim for strict products liability." Id. at 719.
1, See generally Allison, Evidence Supporting Recoverable Damages for Potential
Disease, THE ROLE oF ScrNca tm Toxic TORT LmnGATIoN: EVALUATING CAUSATION AND
RISK 1 (1989); Kanner, supra note 3; Wilkinson, supra note 3. But see Maskin, supra
note 7.
m Martin v. City of New Orleans, 678 F.2d 1321, 1327 (5th Cir. 1982).
" Id.
0 Davis v. Graviss, 672 S.W.2d 928, 929, 932 (Ky. 1984).
(VOL. 7:227
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jury" requirement is the requirement that plaintiff be able to
show he or she is "more likely than not" at risk of developing
cancer or other disease.
6'
The court in Bennett v. Mallinckrodt, Inc. was faced with
determining whether plaintiffs who allegedly suffered exposure
to radioactive emissions could recover on the theory that their
increased risk of developing cancer was a present injury in and
of itself.62 Plaintiffs offered no evidence of current physical
injury, but asserted enhanced risk of developing cancer as their
injury.63 Stressing that the plaintiffs based their claims on "mere
mathematical probabilities,"64 the court held: "Damages based
on mere mathematical probabilities significantly undercompen-
sate those who actually develop cancer and are a windfall to
those who do not. No acceptable definition of justice would
contemplate such a result. Consequently, this claim of injury is
fatally defective."65
A shipyard worker exposed to asbestos who developed as-
bestosis but had not yet shown signs of cancer was able to
recover for his increased risk of cancer in Jackson v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp..6 The plaintiff established that he would
"probably" contract cancer. 67 Because the plaintiff was already
in court to recover for his asbestosis injury, the Fifth Circuit
held that "once some effect appears-then the plaintiff is per-
mitted to recover for all probable future manifestations as well.' '
The court also stated that "having recovered cancer damages,
[the plaintiff] cannot later recover more if and when he develops
cancer.' '69
In comparison, another individual who had developed asbes-
tosis was not able to recover for increased risk of developing
cancer in Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp. because the plaintiff's
experts could not state "to a reasonable medical probability"
that the plaintiff would develop cancer. 70 The Devlin court held
See generally Allison, supra note 57; Maskin, supra note 7; Kanner, supra note
3.




" Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 396 (5th Cir. 1986).
I d. at 411.
Id. at 412.
'Id.
10 Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp. 495 A.2d 495, 497 (N.J. Super. L. 1985).
1991-92]
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that the plaintiff could not recover for the increased risk of
cancer standing alone.7
To recover for increased risk of disease from exposure to
contaminated groundwater, the court in Anderson v. W. R.
Grace & Co. held that plaintiffs had to show that the diseases
they believed they had an enhanced risk of developing were of
the same "disease process" as other illnesses that would result
from exposure to contaminated groundwater. 72 In a cautious
opinion that stressed the need to show a "reasonable probabil-
ity" such future harm would occur, 73 the court held:
Accordingly, action on plaintiffs' claims for the increased risk
of serious future illness, including cancer, must be delayed. If
the future illnesses stem from the same disease process 'as the
illnesses plaintiffs presently complain of, recovery must be
sought in this action. If the disease processes are different,
however, the cause of action for the future illness will not
accrue until the illness manifests itself.
74
"Experts of national renown" appear to have persuaded the
court in Brafford v. Susquehanna to recognize present subcel-
lular and cellular damage resulting from exposure to radiation
as an existing injury from which future harm could flow. 75 The
defendant in Brafford described the subcellular changes as noth-
ing more than a subcellular expression of increased risk, and
maintained that to view it otherwise would allow anyone exposed
to a known carcinogen to recover in tort.76 However, the court
allowed the claim for increased risk to go to trial, recognizing
subcellular change as the requisite injury.
77
Courts have expressed caution and hesitancy in their recog-
nition of claims for increased risk of cancer or other disease in
toxic tort cases. But the case law reflects that judicial skepticism
of speculative claims has not overwhelmed the courts' desire to
allow plaintiffs to recover for the latent effects of toxic exposure.
"1 Id. at 503. Accord Cathcart v. Keene Indus. Insulation, 471 A.2d 493 (Pa.
Super. 1984); Burns v. Jacquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28 (Ariz. App. 1987); Hagerty
v. L & L Marine Services, Inc., 788 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1986).
," Anderson v. W. R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1231 (D. Mass. 1986).
I d.
Id. at 1232.
7, Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14, 18 (D. Colo. 1984).





In a 1958 medical malpractice case, a patient who received
excessive X-ray treatment for bursitis in her shoulder was able
to recover damages from the defendant doctor for what the
court called "cancerphobia," that is, fear that she would develop
cancer as a result of the excessive X-rays.7 1 Based in part on a
neuro-psychiatrist's testimony about the plaintiff's condition, the
court in Ferrara v. Galluchio wrote, "It is entirely plausible,
under such circumstances, that plaintiff would undergo excep-
tional mental suffering over the possibility of developing can-
cer. " 
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Present-day courts have continued to recognize the plausi-
bility of such fear of cancer by awarding damages for cancer-
phobia to victims of toxic torts.8 0 Legal commentators have
noted that cancerphobia claims "seek to avoid the traditional
common-law requirement of a present physical injury as a con-
dition precedent to a personal injury action" by likening the
present fear itself to a present injury in fact.' However, because
cancerphobia is actually a subcategory of damages for emotional
distress or mental anguish,82 the courts have analyzed fear of
cancer claims much like other mental distress claims.
A common question in the courts' analyses of cancerphobia
claims is whether or not the plaintiff has demonstrated that his
or her fear of developing cancer is reasonable. 3 "Because of the
highly subjective nature of emotional distress and the difficulty
in determining its genuineness, courts have traditionally denied
recovery to such claims where there was no direct physical impact
or injury."'" However, the enigmatic qualities of toxic and haz-
ardous substances have led the courts to fashion more flexible
tests for recovery for cancerphobia in toxic tort cases.
A seaman accidently soaked with toxic chemicals sought
recovery for mental anguish due to his fear of developing cancer
from his exposure in Hagerty v. L & L Marine Services, Inc..5
Ferrara v. Galluchio, 152 N.E.2d 249, 251, 253 (N.Y. 1958).
Id. at 253.
See generally Gale & Goyer, supra note 5.
" Id. at 724.
Id. at 725.
" Allison, supra note 57, at 24.
Maskin, supra note 7, at 76, relying on PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS, § 54 at 361, 363 (5th ed. 1984).
81 Hagerty v. L & L Marine Services, Inc., 788 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1986).
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Defendants argued that the plaintiff should be required to show
"physical manifestation" of his cancerphobia, a requirement
defendants contended would guard "against the proliferation of
'unworthy claims." '' 8 6 The court disagreed with the defendants
and wrote:
With or without physical injury or impact, a plaintiff is entitled
to recover damages for serious mental distress arising from
fear of developing cancer where his fear is reasonable and
causally related to the defendant's negligence. The circum-
stances surrounding the fear-inducing occurrence may them-
selves supply sufficient indicia of genuineness. It is for the jury
to decide questions such as the existence, severity and reason-
ableness of the fear.87
Judging the reasonableness of a plaintiff's cancerphobia claim
does not necessarily depend upon whether a plaintiff actually
suffers an enhanced risk of developing cancer. Individuals who
lived near a chemical waste dump containing more than 300,000
fifty-five-gallon drums filled with ultrahazardous waste and hun-
dreds of boxes of dry hazardous waste were awarded damages
for their fear of developing cancer as well as their increased risk
of cancer in Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corporation.81 On
appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the plain-
tiffs did not meet their burden of proof with their increased risk
claims.8 9 The appellate court did, however, find the plaintiffs'
cancerphobia awards to be justified, but excessive. 9° In modify-
ing the Sterling trial court's cancerphobia awards, the appellate
court explained:
While there must be a reasonable connection between the
injured plaintiff's mental anguish and the prediction of a fu-
ture disease, the central focus of a court's inquiry in such a
case is not on the underlying odds that the future disease will
in fact materialize. To this extent, mental anguish resulting
from the chance that an existing injury will lead to the mate-
rialization of a future disease may be an element of recovery
even though the underlying future prospect for susceptibility
Id. at 317-18.
I, d. at 318.
Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corporation, 647 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Tenn. 1986).
Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corporation, 855 F.2d 1188, 1205 (6th Cir. 1988)
(stating that plaintiffs were only able to show that their increased risk was 25 to 30%).
" Id. at 1207.
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to a future disease is not, in and of itself, compensable inas-
much as it is not sufficiently likely to occur. 9'
The Sterling decision of the Sixth Circuit seems to state that
plaintiffs who fail to meet the "more likely than not" burden
of proof with their enhanced risk claims 92 may still be able to
recover for their fear of developing cancer-in spite of the fact
that they have legally and medically been deemed not to be at
a significantly increased risk.93 Relaxation of the reasonableness
and injury requirements for recovery for cancerphobia reflects
the courts' inclination to harmonize the peculiar, latent qualities
of toxic torts with established mental distress tort law.
IV. MEDICAL MONITORING OR SURVEILLANCE
The most novel form of compensation for the latent effects
of toxic substances has been the claim for future medical mon-
itoring or surveillance, that is, the claim for the recovery of
costs of periodic future medical tests of individuals who have
been exposed to toxic substances. 94
The representative case dealing with medical monitoring and
surveillance is Ayers v. Township of Jackson, a 1987 case in
which New Jersey residents sued their township for the contam-
ination of a water supply by pollutants that had leached from a
landfill. 95 The plaintiffs did not assert claims for specific, present
injuries from their alleged exposure to the toxic pollutants.96
Rather, the plaintiffs sued for an increased risk of cancer due
to the exposure, and for the expenses of periodic medical ex-
aminations "to detect symptoms of disease at the earliest pos-
sible opportunity." 97 Plaintiffs' experts testified that such early
detection of disease "could lead to improved prospects for cure,
prolongation of life, relief of pain, and minimization of disabil-
ity. "998
11 Id. at 1206.
12 See supra notes 57-78 and accompanying text.
11 See also Devlin v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 495 A.2d 495, 500 (N.J. Super.
L. 1985) (The court allowed plaintiffs to go forward with their eancerphobia claims, but
not their claims for increased risk of developing cancer because plaintiffs were unable
to provide proof of a reasonable medical probability of such enhanced risk.).
' See generally Allison, supra note 57, at 21-22; Maskin, supra note 7, at 90;
Olson, supra note 16, at 903; Kanner, supra note 3, at 366.
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Defendants tried to quash plaintiffs' claim for medical mon-
itoring by saying such a claim could not be sustained unless
plaintiffs' underlying enhanced risk was of sufficient medical
probability to be compensable in and of itself." The court re-
sponded by writing that "recognition of the medical surveillance
claim is not necessarily dependent on recognition of the enhanced
risk claim."'10
Stating that "[c]ompensation for reasonable and necessary
medical expenses is consistent with well-accepted legal princi-
ples," 0  the court upheld the plaintiffs' lump-sum award for the
costs of future medical monitoring. 0 2 However, the court also
held that court-supervised funds, rather than lump-sum awards,
are more appropriate for paying medical surveillance costs in
mass-exposure cases and should be used in the future. 03
In its endorsement of medical monitoring claims, the Ayers
court discussed how public interests are well-served by the rec-
ognition of such claims:
Although some individuals exposed to hazardous chemicals
may seek regular medical surveillance whether or not the cost
is reimbursed, the lack of reimbursement will undoubtably
deter others from doing so. An application of tort law that
allows post-injury, pre-symptom recovery in toxic tort litiga-
tion for reasonable medical surveillance costs is manifestly
consistent with the public interest in early detection and treat-
ment of disease.
Recognition of pre-symptom claims for medical surveillance
serves other important public interests ... permitting recovery
for reasonable pre-symptom, medical-surveillance expenses
subjects polluters to significant liability when proof of the
causal connection between the tortious conduct and the plain-
" Id.
100 Id.
This analysis assumes that the reasonableness of medical intervention, and,
therefore, its compensability, depends solely on the sufficiency of proof
that the occurrence of the disease is probable. We think this formulation
unduly impedes the ability of courts to recognize that medical science may
necessarily and properly intervene where there is a significant but unquan-
tified risk of serious disease.
Ayers, 525 A.2d at 309.
101 Id. at 311, relying on C. McCormick, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES
§ 90, at 323-327 (1935).
101 Ayers 525 A.2d at 315.
10 Id. at 314.
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tiffs' exposure to chemicals is likely to be most readily avail-
able. The availability of a substantial remedy before the
consequences of the plaintiffs' exposure are manifest may also
have the beneficial effect of preventing or mitigating serious
future illnesses and thus reduce the overall costs to the respon-
sible parties. °4
Pre- and post-Ayers decisions have also recognized claims
for the recovery of medical monitoring costs. 105 The Fifth Circuit
allowed a plaintiff who had been soaked with chemicals in
Hagerty v. L & L Marine Services, Inc. to recover for the
reasonable costs of periodic medical checkups.106 In the 1984
case Askey v. Occidental Chemical Corporation, individuals who
claimed they had been exposed to toxic waste from a landfill
were allowed to seek recovery for the future costs of medical
monitoring, "provided that . . . [they could] establish with a
reasonable degree of medical certainty that such expenditures
are 'reasonably anticipated' to be incurred by reason of their
exposure."'' 0 The Third Circuit in In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB
Litigation recognized that medical monitoring was "one of a
growing number of non-traditional torts that have developed in
the common law to compensate plaintiffs who have been exposed
to various toxic substances." ' as Approving the cause of action
for the recovery of medical surveillance costs, the Paoli court
wrote:
Medical monitoring claims acknowledge that, in a toxic age,
significant harm can be done to an individual by a tortfeasor,
notwithstanding latent manifestation of that harm ....
[R]ecognizing this tort does not require courts to speculate
about the probability of future injury. It merely requires courts
to ascertain the probability that the far less costly remedy of
medical supervision is appropriate. Allowing plaintiffs to re-
Id. at 311-312.
IO See Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp. 495 A.2d 495, 503 (N.J. Super. L. 1985)
(medical monitoring claim could be heard by a jury); Burns v. Jacquays Mining Corp.,
752 P.2d 28, 39 (Ariz. App. Ct. 1987) (plaintiffs who had no physical manifestation of
asbestos-related disease were awarded medical monitoring expenses to be dispensed
through a court-supervised fund); Viflari v. Terminix Intern., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 727,
735 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (plaintiffs put forth sufficient evidence of physical injury caused
by termiticide spill to support claim for medical surveillance costs).
106 Hagerty v. L & L Marine Services, Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1986).
Askey v. Occidental Chemical Corporation, 477 N.Y.S.2d 242, 247 (A.D. 4
Dept. 1984).
"06 In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 916 F.2d 829, 849 (3rd Cir. 1990).
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cover the cost of this care deters irresponsible discharge of
toxic chemicals by defendants and encourages plaintiffs to
detect and treat their injuries as soon as possible. 09
Judicial acceptance of the medical monitoring cause of action
reflects the courts' understanding that such surveillance is nec-
essary for the early detection of the latent effects of toxic ex-
posure-detection which is critical to ensure that victims of toxic
exposure receive prompt and appropriate medical treatment.
V. THE FENDs FOR ALL CHLDREN DOCTRINE
In a groundbreaking decision supporting plaintiffs' rights of
fair recovery, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
in Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corpo-
ration affirmed the district court's grant of an injunction re-
quiring the defendant Lockheed to set up a fund to pay for the
initial diagnostic tests of Vietnamese orphans who survived a
Lockheed plane crash."10
A representative of the orphans who survived the 1975 plane
crash sued Lockheed Aircraft Corporation on their behalf, al-
leging that as a result of the decompression in the plane's com-
partment and the crash itself, the orphans suffered a neurological
development disorder known as Minimal Brain Dysfunction
(MBD)."1 The plaintiffs supported their claim for this form of
"pre-litigation" medical monitoring with the testimony of med-
ical experts who stated that it was important that the plaintiffs
be diagnosed promptly."
2
The district court found that it could not be "reasonably
disputed that the need for some diagnostic examinations ...
[was] itself a proximate result of this particular crash.""' 3 Real-
izing that an injunction forcing the defendant to pay for the
costs of diagnosing plaintiffs' potential injuries was "quite un-
usual," the district court justified its decision to grant the in-
junction by relying on the following: Lockheed had stipulated
as to its liability for compensatory damages; the examinations
m Id. at 852.
110 Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, 746 F.2d 816,
826 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
" Id. at 819.
'2 Id. at 826.
"I Id. at 822.
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were needed "immediately;" the plaintiffs had made a strong
showing that a jury would award damages equivalent to the cost
of reasonable diagnostic examinations; and the diagnostic exams
would serve the public interest.'
4
The district court ordered Lockheed to create a $450,000
fund from which the reasonable expenses of diagnostic tests
would be paid."5 The court mandated a voucher system for the
fund to govern disbursement." 6 Also, Lockheed's money was to
be put into an interest-bearing account which, "in the absence
of showing of good cause," would revert to Lockheed after
completion of the diagnostic exams." 7
On appeal, Lockheed's primary argument was that there was
no precedence in District of Columbia tort law for the recovery
of the costs of diagnostic exams to discover whether a plaintiff
is injured when that plaintiff has not proven actual physical
injury."' In its decision to recognize this "new" cause of action,
the appellate court wrote: "Sustaining a cause of action for
diagnostic examinations in the circumstances here serves the two
-principal purposes of tort law-the deterrence of misconduct
and the provision of just compensation to victims of wrongdo-
ing." 9 The court held that but for the fact of the crash, no
diagnostic tests would be needed. 20
While stating that it was within the court's "deep-rooted
power of equity to do what is necessary and appropriate to
achieve justice in [an] individual[ized] case,"'' the Friends for
All Children court also specified the boundaries of its decision:
[W]e emphasize the narrowness of today's holding. We hold
only that a preliminary injunction requiring the defendant to
create a fund to pay for diagnostic exams is proper when the
defendant has been held liable for the cost of such examina-
Id. at 822-823.
" Id. at 818.
11 Friends for All Children, 746 F.2d at 823.
' Id. at 823 n.10. "If the jury awards less than the total amount a plaintiff has
withdrawn from the fund and received ... the plaintiff will, of course, be obligated to
pay Lockheed the difference." Id. at 832 n.26.
I's Id. at 824.
19 Id. at 825.
" Id. The appellate court rejected Lockheed's suggestion that, by virtue of the
fact that the children had been living in Vietnamese orphanages, the children were
already in need of diagnostic exams to test them for MBD. Friends for All Children,
746 F.2d at 826-827.
"I Id. at 830.
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tions and when delay inherent in trying the case to compute
the amount of the defendant's liability will result in irreparable
injury.12
Because the plaintiffs were not indigent, Lockheed argued
that it should not be forced to pay for their diagnostic exams.
2 1
The appellate court responded by holding that "the District
Court could quite properly conclude that medical expenses run-
ning into thousands of dollars would likely constitute a formi-
dable obstacle to families of moderate means."'
In conclusion, the court wrote, "Thus, fairly viewed, Lock-
heed's potential injury pales in comparison to the potentially
deteriorating condition that these children face in the absence of
prompt diagnostic examinations."'2
CONCLUSION
Although the Friends for All Children court called the cir-
cumstances of that case "peculiar,"' 26 the rationale of that de-
cision was discussed by the Ayers v. Township of Jackson court
in its opinion recognizing the medical monitoring cause of action
in toxic tort cases.' 27 By discussing the Friends for All Children
decision, the Ayers court was instinctively assessing the similar-
ities between the medical monitoring cause of action and the
payment of initial diagnostic exams by a defendant.
The medical monitoring cause of action and the requirement
that a defendant pay for a plaintiff's diagnostic tests as set out
in the Friends for All Children decision are two sides of the
same coin-both require payment of necessary medical tests by
a defendant who is liable for the event that warranted such tests.
In a medical monitoring cause of action, the defendant has been
found liable, for example, through the traditional litigation proc-
ess. In a Friends for All Children action for pre-trial diagnostic
tests, a defendant has been found liable by a primafacie showing
of liability. The safety net in a pre-trial diagnostic test action is
Im Id. at 831.
"2 Id. at 836.
, Id. at 836. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals also rejected
Lockheed's contention that the costs of such diagnostic tests could be covered by public
health services. Id. at 837.
Friends for All Children, 746 F.2d at 838.
12' Id.
Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 309-310 (N.J. 1987).
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that the defendant can recover the costs of such tests from the
plaintiff if the defendant prevails on the merits of the case.
The latent effects of toxic substances thwart victims of such
exposure from proving traditional injuries-in-fact. Because of
the subtlety of the effects of toxic substances on the human
body, prompt diagnosis may be necessary to ensure appropriate
medical attention. However, the costs of such critical diagnostic
tests may be so high that victims of toxic exposure are precluded
from establishing that they have suffered injuries-in-fact; thus
they are also foreclosed from receiving just compensation for
tortfeasors' wrongdoings as well as for necessary medical treat-
ment.
The courts have shaped traditional tort law to encompass
the unusual qualities of toxic substance injuries. Given the sim-
ilarities between the medical monitoring cause of action and the
Friends for All Children action for pre-trial diagnostic tests,
judicial approval of such pre-trial diagnostic tests is the next
step in the evolution of toxic tort law.
Kathleen A. O'Nan
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